In the context of this broader debate, this paper examines what the IMF has actually assumed about net aid flows in the programs it supports. We focus on the baseline projections (not any alternative scenarios) and ask the following questions:
• What has been the profile of net aid flows assumed in IMF programs with low-income countries?
• Has this profile changed over time or for particular groups of countries, especially SubSaharan Africa?
• How do countries' starting positions influence the IMF projections? (For example, is aid to countries with relatively low per capita aid assumed to grow faster?)
• How do the projections of aid in recent IMF programs compare with donors' global commitments, such as at the Gleneagles G-8 Summit, and have these projections become more optimistic post-Gleneagles?
Our focus is on what the IMF has assumed, not on actual outcomes. Earlier evidence suggests that, compared to outcomes, IMF program projections have not been unduly pessimistic. For example, the 2004 evaluation of the PRSP and PRGF by the Independent Evaluation Office of the IMF concluded that, on average, program design allowed for larger external financing flows than actually occurred. 5 But more recent evidence for Sub-Saharan Africa suggests that initial IMF programs may have under-predicted aid for the medium term. 6 Of course, such comparisons cannot answer the broader questions of whether the IMF should be playing a more proactive role in mobilizing additional aid and what the impact might be on aid levels.
To address the questions listed above, we looked at projections of net aid over the medium term in two sets of IMF programs: (i) all original IMF-supported programs under its concessional lending facilities-the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility ( ESAF) and its successor, the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) during the period January 1997 through January 2007 (77 programs in 46 countries); 7 and (ii) all original programs and any reviews (i.e., any time the IMF formally revisited its aid projections) in the 18-month period before and after the July 2005 G8 Gleneagles Summit.
Details of the data sources and the countries and programs included in each data set are given in Appendix I.
For the purposes of this paper, net aid is defined as grants plus gross concessional loans less amortization actually paid (i.e., after taking account of debt service flow relief). Extracting this information from IMF reports proved more difficult than we had expected, since the treatment of some components of aid flows-especially debt relief-is complex and varies substantially among different country reports.
Aid Projections in Original Programs
The broad profile for projected aid has been remarkably similar across different groups of countries. For all programs, aid is projected to expand substantially in the initial program year (t 0 ) (by 26 percent for the entire sample) before tapering off by the third year (t 2 ) ( Table 1 and Figure 1 ). This pattern holds true for projections of aid in Sub-Saharan African countries. The table shows both median and unweighted means (excluding three outliers) 8 and the broad pattern is the same for both measures. Under the PRGF, projected aid grew more steadily through the second year of the projection but also tapered off by the third year (Table 1) . By the end of the program, aid projections for PRGF programs generally exceeded those for ESAF programs. 9 The increase in projected aid between the two groups of programs was much larger for the means than the medians, indicating that the increases in aid projections under the PRGF were not uniformly distributed.
We examined the influences of several factors on the medium-term program projections for aid, using the percentage change in net aid over the 3-year period as the dependent variable. (PRGF arrangements are for an initial period of 3 years and this period is the focus of most program projections for the "medium term".) The results indicate that the IMF program projections implicitly assumed that countries with low initial levels of aid per capita would benefit from faster growth in aid (Table 3 and Figure 2 ). Dummy variables testing the importance of geographic location (Sub-Saharan Africa) and shift from the ESAF to PRGF were not significant at the 5% level.
10 Quantitatively, a 1-percent lower initial net aid per capita was associated with a 1-percentage point increase in projected growth in net aid over the 3-year period. This result was, statistically, highly significant. In other words, IMF program projections implicitly assume that countries with lower aid per capita will receive a gradually increasing share of global aid. As noted earlier, this may reflect the fact that our sample only includes the "late" vintage of ESAF-supported programs. This statement was part of a broader trend of global commitments to expand aid, in total and to Africa in particular. To investigate how IMF program projections for aid have responded to this changed environment, we examined all publicly available program projections for aid (in original programs or reviews) made for countries with PRGF arrangements in the 18 months before and after the Summit.
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The results indicate four key conclusions about IMF aid projections:
• Over the medium-term, the global profile of aid projections in IMF programs is substantially less optimistic than the Gleneagles commitments. Weighted by the initial level of aid, average growth in net aid in IMF programs is projected to be broadly consistent with Gleneagles commitments in the first and second year of projections but diverges starkly in the third year (See Figure 3 and Table 3 ). 13 This pessimism over the medium term is attributable, in part, to declining aid projections 11 For further details, see the official website of the summit at www.g8.gov.uk 12 Excluding Lesotho (Sixth Review, Pre-G8 Summit) and Azerbaijan (Fifth Review, Pre-G8 Summit). Lesotho is treated as an outlier due to its extremely low initial net aid flow in year t -1 (fiscal year 2003, $1.3 million). Azerbaijan is treated as an outlier due to high aid volatility resulting from lumpy amortization payments. to Afghanistan but is also broad-based with only 37% of post-Gleneagles Summit projections more optimistic than the path implied by the Gleneagles commitments. IMF Pre-Gleneagles IMF Post-Gleneagles Implied Gleneagles Path project aid to increase but by less than implied by the Gleneagles path. Of those that increase at a pace consistent with or faster than the Gleneagles commitments, a small number are projected to receive large increases in aid (i.e. Moldova, Armenia, Zambia). (Table 3 and Figure 5 ). Of the 27 IMF programs and reviews in Sub-Saharan Africa that were completed in the postGleneagles period, only two were more optimistic than the Gleneagles projections of aid to Africa. • For countries outside of Sub-Saharan Africa, the weighted mean projected path of aid is closer to a path consistent with the Gleneagles commitments, although there was actually some deterioration in the levels of aid projected before and after the Summit (Figure 6 ). This reflects the relatively small number of countries involved and the particular circumstances of Afghanistan (the latter entered into a new program with the IMF in 2006, but aid is projected to decline over the medium term). On an unweighted basis, projected aid to countries outside Africa is projected to increase substantially ( Figure 7) . We examined various influences on this group of projections (see Table 4 ). Once again, the results suggest that IMF program projections have a statistically significant tendency to project faster growth in aid when initial net aid per capita is low. After controlling for the influence of starting aid levels, the IMF also showed a strong, and statistically significant, tendency to project faster growth in non-Sub-Saharan African countries after the Gleneagles Summit. There is little evidence, however, to suggest that the IMF assumed faster aid growth in post-Gleneagles SubSaharan African projections. This is surprising given the focus on Africa in many recent global pronouncements on aid.
17 Notes: t-statistics listed in parentheses * Significant at the 10% level *** Significant at the 1% level.
Is the problem with the Messenger or the Message?
These results indicate that, in its programs for most Sub-Saharan African countries, the IMF has serious doubts that donors will meet their commitments to double aid by 2010. Is the IMF at fault for making such relatively conservative projections? This depends largely on how much of a role the IMF should play as a catalyst for aid-an issue we will return to in the concluding section. But recent information from the OECD supports a rather skeptical view of the amounts of additional aid that is in the pipeline. Figure 6 ). In this scenario (which is not a forecast), the targets for global aid and for aid to Sub-Saharan Africa are possible only with fairly heroic annual aid growth in the final years of the decade. This path for scaling-up aid is, of course, still possible but it suggests cause for concern on the degree to which the broad commitments made at Gleneagles are likely to be translated into actual disbursements. 
Concluding thoughts
There is no straightforward measuring rod for determining the "desirable" level of aid for a country. Macroeconomic frameworks that merely extrapolate past levels of aid, on the grounds of prudence, would not fulfill the IMF's undertaking to help countries manage the macroeconomic challenges of absorbing increased aid flows. The evidence discussed in the paper suggests that the IMF has moved beyond such very conservative projections. However, looking at programs collectively, it has not gone so far as to take the donor community at their word that increased aid for Africa will be available in the amounts suggested at the Gleneagles Summit. Of course, the caution suggested by the earlier quote from Mr. De Rato's speech may well be justified. There is a history of actual aid falling short of donor commitments and recent OECD projections provide some grounds for such skepticism. Nevertheless, the extent of the shortfall between what the IMF is assuming for Africa and donors' global statements is striking and suggests the need for greater clarity about the IMF role in this area.
Economic analysis alone cannot provide the answer on the appropriate role for the IMF in the international aid architecture. This, ultimately, depends on how proactive donor and recipient countries want the IMF to be in providing catalytic signals about levels of aid. But much greater clarity is needed about exactly what signal the IMF is sending to donors through its mediumterm macroeconomic projections. There are four broad options:
1. The IMF would take the level of aid as given, based on a survey of donors' existing intentions. It would derive a macroeconomic framework consistent with this aid level and objectives of macro stability. But it would state explicitly that it took no view whatsoever on the compatibility of this framework and level of aid with any objectives related to development or achieving the MDGs, which were beyond its expertise. 2. The IMF would take the level of aid as given and prepare the macro framework as in the first case. Based on inputs from others, it would also give its judgment if there were strong reasons to doubt that this framework were compatible with the MDGs. 3. The IMF would make an assessment, based on sector-level inputs, of the macroeconomic effects of a significant scaling-up of aid so as to help the international community and the country itself judge whether there are any macroeconomic constraints to absorbing more aid. This assessment could be in the form of an alternative scenario. The obvious benchmark to use for the level of aid assumed in such a scenario would be that aid grows at least as fast as implied in donors' commitments for global aid (e.g. each African country would have a scenario consistent with a doubling of aid by 2010.) 4. Working with sector-level inputs from others, the IMF would devise a macroeconomic framework and estimates of aid requirements to achieve the MDGs (i.e. the full-fledged "needs-based" approach).
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